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ten countries supports the new theory. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Empirical research on the relationship between the nominal interest rate and the price 
level has left monetary economists with two puzzles. On the one hand, in one of the most 
influential works on monetary economics, Irving Fisher (1930) suggested a positive 
relationship between the nominal interest rate and the growth rate of the price level. 
However, little empirical evidence has been found for such a relationship prior to World 
War II.
1 On the other hand, the nominal interest rate and price level are positively related 
before World War I and the relationship apparently disappeared after that. Because the 
prewar relationship seemed to be inconsistent with the neutrality of money, John 
Maynard Keynes (1930) dubbed it Gibson’s Paradox and considered it to be “one of the 




World War I marked not only the apparent disappearance of Gibson’s Paradox but also 
the end of the classical gold standard. Building on these apparent facts, Robert Barsky 
and Lawrence Summers (1988) formulated a model to explain Gibson’s Paradox as a 
phenomenon that depended on the peculiarities of the classical gold standard. They 
showed that the modest real interest shocks documented by Robert Shiller and Jeremy 
Siegel (1977) might have appreciably affected the demand for gold, inducing an 
appreciable change in the price level. If the shocks were also persistent, the inflation 
premium in nominal interest rates would be little affected. As a result, a positive real 
interest shock would increase both the nominal interest rate and the price level. With the 
demise of the classical gold standard, these mechanisms would no longer operate and 
therefore Gibson’s Paradox would vanish.
3 
 
                                                 
1 See Richard Roll (1972) and Thomas Sargent (1973) for surveys of the evidence. 
2 Keynes (1930, v. 2, p. 198) believed that A. H. Gibson, a British financial journalist, had discovered the 
relationship first (Gibson, 1923), but Knut Wicksell had documented the same relation 16 years earlier 
(Wicksell, 1907). 
3 Many prominent economists have also provided their own explanations of the Gibson’s Paradox, 
including Fisher, Wicksell, Keynes, and Sargent, to name just a few. For details, see Milton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz (1982). Gerald Dwyer (1984) documented the instability of Gibson’s Paradox across 
different monetary systems in four countries.    2
This paper provides answers to the following three questions. First, what does theory 
predict the relationship to be between the nominal interest rate and the growth rate of the 
price level under a commodity standard? That is, are the “non-Fisherian” empirical 
findings for the period before World War II really due to poor data as alleged by Eugene 
Fama (1975)? Second, is the Gibson paradox only a gold-standard phenomenon? And 
finally, is it possible for the nominal interest rate to be related to the growth rate of the 
price level and also to the price level itself, and how are these two relationships 
connected? 
 
We propose a New Keynesian framework that provides answers to these questions. In 
particular, our model is flexible enough to incorporate both the gold standard and fiat 
money standards as special cases. The model shows that the relationship between the 
nominal interest rate and the subsequent growth rate of the price level (henceforth, the 
Fama-Fisher effect) should be negative and the relationship between the nominal interest 
rate and the price level (henceforth, the Gibson effect) should be positive when money is 
inelastically supplied and prices are flexible. Because these conditions were met before 
World War I, a twin paradox (i.e. a negative Fama-Fisher effect and a positive Gibson 
effect) arose during this period. 
 
Our analysis further suggests that the gold standard had relatively little to do with 
generating either Gibson’s Paradox or the Fama-Fisher Paradox and also that they might 
not actually have vanished after World War I. Data from the interwar period verify this 
conjecture: both Gibson’s Paradox and the Fama-Fisher Paradox characterize this period 
as well as the period before World War I. 
 
A positive Fama-Fisher effect has emerged in the postwar period. In our model, this 
phenomenon reflects more elastically supplied money and stickier prices. For example, a 
positive Fama-Fisher effect arises if the central bank pursues a Taylor-type rule for the 
nominal interest rate and faces sufficiently sticky prices. Under these conditions, our 
model implies a Gibson effect of indeterminate sign. Empirically, its point estimates   3
continue to be mostly positive albeit statistically insignificant. In this sense, then, the 
postwar period is no longer paradoxical. 
 
In section 2 we lay out a flexible model that allows the elasticity of the money supply and 
the flexibility of prices to vary. During the classical gold standard period, money was 
inelastically supplied and prices were flexible, while during the postwar period when fiat 
money standards prevailed, money was elastic and prices were sticky. The theoretical 
implications for the Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects are derived under each set of 
assumptions. Empirical evidence using pre-WWI data from seven industrialized countries 
is presented in section 3, followed by interwar and postwar evidence in section 4. Some 
final conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
 
2  A Simple Model 
 
We follow Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler (1999) in specifying the first two 
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In equations (1) and (2), t is a discrete index of time that assumes the values 1, 2, 3, ⋅⋅⋅; it 
is the nominal interest rate on a riskless one-period bond bought in period t and maturing 
in period t+1; pt is the logarithm of the price level; yt is the logarithm of output; 
*
t y  is the 
logarithm of the natural level of output; ϕ, β and κ are parameters; ut is an error term that 
follows the first-order autoregressive process 
  1 ,1 ; tt t uu ρυ ρ − =+ <  (3) 
υt is an independently and identically distributed error term with a zero mean and finite 
variance; ρ is a parameter; and u0 and p0 are fixed initial values. 
 
                                                 
4 To avoid notational clutter, we assume that the intercepts in all equations of our model are zero.   4
Equation (1), the New Keynesian IS Curve, arises from the optimizing decisions of 
households and firms about when to consume and when to produce as mediated by the 
expected real interest rate à la Fisher. The error term ut is a persistent shock to aggregate 
demand, which could arise from predictable changes in time preference, the share of 
output consumed by the government or adjustment costs for the capital stock.
5 
 
Equation (2), the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, arises from the optimizing decisions of 
firms in setting their sticky prices. The parameter κ is larger, the more flexible their 
prices are. In the limiting case of perfect flexibility (κ → ∞), output always equals its 
natural level ()
* . tt yy =  Without loss of generality, we assume that firms experience no 
exogenous shocks to their markups. 
 
For simplicity, we posit that the logarithm of the economy’s natural level of output is a 
random walk: 
 
* , tt yv ∆=  (4) 
where vt is an independently and identically distributed error term with a zero mean and 
finite variance and 
*
0 y  is a fixed initial value. The error term vt is a supply shock arising 
from exogenous changes in factor supplies and total factor productivity. 
 
Households and firms also demand money. We assume that their demand for money 
takes the form 
 ,, 0 ,
d
tt t t mp yi ηλη λ =+ − >  (5) 
where 
d
t m  is the logarithm of the stock of money demanded and η and λ are parameters. 
For simplicity, we specify the elasticity of money demand with respect to the price level 
to be one even though it probably differed from one under the gold standard.
6 We also 
                                                 
5 This is one interpretation of the shock considered by Robert Barsky and Lawrence Summers (1988). 
6 Under the gold standard, money consisted of gold coins and claims on gold held in the vaults of private 
banks and governments. Gold also served nonmonetary functions, reflecting its shininess, malleability, 
ductility, and resistance to corrosion. Its price-level elasticity should be positive, however, since its relative   5
specify the income elasticity η and the interest semielasticity λ to be positive and 
constant. Without loss of generality, we omit any error term from equation (5) since its 
effect can be absorbed by µt in equation (6) below. 
 
We assume that money is supplied according to the equation 
  1 () , 0 , 0 , tt t t t t mi E p e γ τµ γ τ + ∆= − ∆ −+ ≥ >  (6) 
where γ and τ are parameters, µt and et are independently and identically distributed error 
terms with zero means and finite variances, and m0 is a fixed initial value. We specify the 
parameter γ to have been zero in the period before World War I and to have been positive 
and substantial in more recent periods. 
 
The monetary arrangements in the United States before the founding of the Federal 
Reserve System were often criticized for failing to provide an “elastic currency.” In a 
sense, then, equation (6) with γ  = 0 may be thought of as a perfectly inelastic currency, 
while an appreciable γ  would represent an elastic currency. In the limit as γ  approaches 
infinity, the currency becomes perfectly elastic. 
 
On its face, our formulation of how the stock of money evolved under the commodity 
standards that prevailed before World War I would seem to be inconsistent with the fact 
that monetary metals were produced by private profit-maximizing firms. The production 
of these firms should have been decreasing in the price level since the price of their 
product was fixed and their variable costs were proportional to the price level. This 
reasoning suggests that ∆mt should have taken the form  tt t mp δµ ∆= − +  with δ > 0 
under the commodity standards in place before World War I. The model would, however, 
imply that pt is covariance stationary, an implication that is not supported by the data; see 
the next section. Further evidence for the exogeneity of ∆ mt during this period has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
price falls as the price level rises. Qualitatively, it is unimportant whether the elasticity is one or some other 
positive value.   6
provided by Barsky and Summers (1991), who document that technological shocks in the 
gold-mining industry dominated gold production. 
 
Under fiat standards, we assume that central banks resist changes in the nominal interest 
rate and expected inflation. In particular, they meet a higher nominal interest rate or a 
lower expectation of inflation with a higher growth rate of the money supply; and 
conversely. In the extreme case in which γ approaches infinity, the central bank conducts 
its monetary policy using the forward-looking Taylor rule 
  1 . tt t t iE pe τ + =∆+  (7) 
 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Christina Romer and David Romer (2002) 
have shown that forward-looking Taylor rules approximate the conduct of monetary 
policy during at least some periods and for many countries. Furthermore, many, if not 
most, central banks have long conducted monetary policy by manipulating the level of 
short-term interest rates. The error term et is a shock to monetary policy, which might 
arise if the central bank’s target for inflation varies over time. 
 
Equilibrium for the economy consists of a sequence of log price levels {pt}, nominal 
interest rates {it}, log outputs {yt}, and log stocks of money demanded and supplied 
{,}
d
tt mm in periods t = 1, 2, 3, ⋅⋅⋅ such that equations (1)-(6) hold; the market for money 
is in equilibrium 
 ;
d
tt mm =  (8) 
and u0, p0, 
*
t y  and m0 take on fixed initial values.
7 
 




                                                 
7 In the background, factors of production and bonds are also being demanded and supplied, and their 
demands and supplies are being equated.   7
2.1 Case  I:  γ = 0 and κ → ∞ 
 
The period before World War I differs from more recent periods in two stark ways. First 
and most obviously, the gold-mining and to a lesser extent the silver-mining industries 
rather than central banks determined how money supplies evolved over time. Second, 
prices were highly flexible; see Charles Calomiris and Glenn Hubbard (1989) and 
Christopher Hanes and John James (2003) for evidence. We model these features of the 
period by equating γ to zero and letting κ approach infinity so that equation (2) reduces to 
*
tt yy =  and equation (4) becomes 
       . tt yv ∆=                 (4′) 
 
Equations (5), (6), (8), and (4′) imply that 
 . tt t t p iv λµ η ∆= ∆ + −  (9) 
Substituting equations (9) and (4′) into equation (1) then yields 
  1 tt t t iE iu λ + =∆ + 
since Etµt+1 = Etvt+1 = 0. Solving this equation forward and using equation (3) gives us  













== ∑∑  
or 
 
1 [1 (1 )] . tt iu λρ
− =+ −  (10) 
Finally, using equation (10) to eliminate ∆it from equation (9), we have 
 
1 [1 (1 )] . tt t t p uv λρ λ µ η
− ∆=+ − ∆+ −  (11) 
 
It is straightforward to verify that both the Fama-Fisher Paradox and the Gibson Paradox 
arise in Case I. Consider the estimator obtained by applying OLS to the regression 
  1 tF t F t pi βε − ∆ =+  (12)   8
where βF is a parameter, εFt is an error term, and F refers to Fama (1975), who first 
employed such regressions to test Fisher’s Theory of Interest (1930).
8,9 Equations  (10) 
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which is negative and certainly not one as Fama and Fisher hypothesized. 
 
In contrast, consider the estimator obtained by applying OLS to the regression
10 
 , tG t G t pi β ε ∆= ∆ +  (13) 
where βG is a parameter, ε Gt is an error term, and G refers to Gibson (1923). The resulting 
estimator converges in probability to   
2
2
cov( , ) [1 (1 )] var( )
,














which is positive and equal to the interest semielasticity of money demand. 
 
Consider a positive demand shock in period 1. The nominal interest rate rises, and given 
the inelastic money supply and flexible prices, the price level also rises. This causes a  
                                                 
8 Fama maintained that the expected real interest rate is always constant. Given this maintained assumption, 
we then have 
∆pt = constant intercept + it-1 – (∆pt–Et-1∆pt)  
Under the assumption that expectations are rational, it-1 is orthogonal to (∆pt–Et-1∆pt) so that applying OLS 
to equation (12) cum intercept should yield an estimator with a probability limit of one. Of course, in the 
model entertained here, the expected real interest rate is ut-1, which is far from constant. 
9 Fisher’s identity, that the nominal interest rate equals the expected real interest rate plus the expected 
inflation rate, cannot be tested; it merely defines the expected real interest rate. Rather, Fama tested his and 
Fisher’s maintained assumption that the expected real interest rate is constant while also maintaining the 
assumption of rational expectations. 
10 Note that in the model considered here, the statistical properties of the estimator obtained by applying 
OLS to the regression 
pt = βGit + EGt 
are nonstandard. The reason is that pt is difference-stationary while it is covariance-stationary. To obtain an 
estimator with standard statistical properties, one must estimate a regression on differenced data; e.g., the 
one in the text.   9




contemporaneous positive correlation between the nominal interest rate and the price 
level; i.e., a positive Gibson's effect. However, because the demand shock is only 
temporary, the price level must subsequently return to its original level in the absence of 
other shocks. As a result, the inflation rate in subsequent periods must be less than 
average, resulting in a negative correlation between the current nominal interest rate and 
subsequent inflation, i.e. a negative Fama-Fisher effect. These responses are illustrated in 
Figure 1, which plots the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the nominal interest rate, 
price level and inflation rate. 
 
As a matter of fact, the gold standard is not a necessary condition for a positive Gibson's 
effect and a negative Fama-Fisher effect. As long as money is inelastically supplied and 
prices are flexible, such a configuration of the two effects may arise in other periods. In 
this sense our approach is more general than that of Barsky and Summers (1988). 
Moreover, in the example given above, a positive Gibson's effect directly implies a   10
negative Fama-Fisher effect. This might explain why most work before Fama’s (1975) 
failed to find a Fisherian coefficient even close to positive one.
11 
 
2.2 Case  II:  γ → ∞ and κ < ∞ 
 
We are modeling central banks as having followed Taylor rules of the form (7) in recent 
years. In addition, we are also assuming that prices are sticky to an appreciable extent. 
Letting 
*, tt t x yy ≡−  we can solve equation (2) forward to express the current inflation 











∆= ∑  (14) 
Substituting equations (7) and (14) into equation (1), using the identity 
*
tt t x yy ≡−  and 
rearranging the resulting equation yields 
  11
0
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since 
*
1 0. tt Ey + ∆= The minimum-state-variable solution to this expectational difference 
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or 
 
1 1 (1 )(1 ) ( 1) tt t p ue ρβ ρ κρ ϕ τ ϕ κ ϕ
− −  ∆ = −− + −−    (17) 
since et is serially independent.
13 Finally, substituting equation (17) into equation (7), we 
have 
                                                 
11 The empirical work before Fama attempted to estimate this coefficient by regressing an interest rate on 
current and lagged inflation rates and summing the estimated coefficients. However, this coefficient sum 
has no straightforward interpretation if agents form rational expectations; see Sargent (1973) for further 
discussion of this point. 
12 One can verify this by substituting equation (16) into equation (15). If τ ≤ 1, there are multiple solutions 
to equation (15) including ones with sunspots. We do not consider those solutions in this paper.   11
{}
1 1
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or 
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− −  =− − + − +   (18) 
 
It is straightforward to verify that the Fama-Fisher effect is now positive and that the 
Gibson effect is of indeterminate sign. Equations (17) and (18) imply that the OLS 
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which lies strictly between zero and τ
-1 and à fortiori between zero and one if τ  > 1. It is 
appreciable unless the central bank is highly aggressive (τ  >> 1) or highly erratic (var et 
>> var ut). We therefore expect estimates of βF to be positive, less than one, and highly 
significant under inconvertible fiat standards. In section 4, we present evidence consistent 
with this prediction of the theory. 
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13 Both inflation and interest rate have become much more persistent during the postwar period. Introducing 
persistency into et does not alter the main result but does complicate the analysis. We defer it to the 
appendix.   12
Figure 2. Impulse Response Functions for a Demand Shock 




which can be negligibly positive or even negative if monetary policy is sufficiently 
variable relative to demand shocks; i.e., var et/var ut is sufficiently large. 
 
Once again consider a positive demand shock in period 1. Because it is persistent and the 
central bank does not entirely offset its effects, the current inflation rate and next period’s 
inflation rate rise. In anticipation of increased future inflation, the central bank raises the 
current nominal interest rate, leading to a positive correlation between the current 
nominal interest rate and next period’s inflation rate; i.e., a positive Fama-Fisher effect. 
The increase in the inflation rate also results in an increase in the current price level, 
thereby contributing positively to the Gibson effect. These responses are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
This contribution is at least partly offset, and could be more than offset, by a second 
effect. Consider a positive shock to the nominal interest rate generated by a reduction in 
the central bank’s desired inflation rate. This shock increases the current nominal interest    13
Figure 3. Impulse Response Functions for a Disinflationary 




rate and reduces the current inflation rate and price level, thereby contributing negatively 
to the Gibson effect. By contrast, because this shock is completely transitory, it does not 
contribute to the correlation between the current nominal interest rate and next period’s 
inflation rate. These responses are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
3  Empirical Analysis for the Period before World War I 
 
3.1 The  Data 
 
We estimate equations (12) and (13) using annual data on the wholesale price indices and 
short-term nominal interest rates of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland for periods when those countries   14
adhered to commodity standards and were not in political turmoil.
14 For the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Germany the wholesale price indices comes from Table 
I1 of Brian Mitchell (1992). The short-term interest rates for the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, Germany, Holland, and Switzerland come from Tables 23, 27, 29, 31, 
33, 34, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, and 71 of Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla (1991). For the 
United States, the wholesale price index comes from Table 1 of George Warren and 
Frank Pearson (1935) and the short-term interest rate comes from Table 10 of Frederick 
Macaulay (1938). The US data were originally monthly; we averaged them to obtain our 
annual series. 
 
Wholesale price indices are not available for the Netherlands and Switzerland. We proxy 
the Dutch wholesale price index with a geometric average of those for Belgium, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom and the Swiss wholesale price index with a geometric 
average of those for France and Germany. These countries are nearby and are assumed to 
have experienced similar price-level movements. 
 
By far our longest sample is for the United Kingdom, which adhered to the gold standard 
from shortly after passage of the Resumption Act of 1819 until World War I began in 
August 1914. The years 1825-1913 comprise our sample since the open-market rate of 
discount is not available before 1824. 
 
The sample periods for the other countries are shorter: Belgium, 1849-1913; France, 
1873-1913; Germany, 1872-1913; the Netherlands, 1874-1912; Switzerland, 1851-1913; 
and the United States, 1879-1913. These sample periods are dictated partly by the 
availability of data but primarily by the narratives provided by Homer and Sylla, who 




                                                 
14 Many of these countries were on bimetallic (gold-silver) standards before the 1870s. For the purposes of 
this paper, it is not important which mining industry determined a country’s monetary policies so long as its 
money supply followed an exogenous process like equation (6) with γ  = 0.   15
3.2 Unit-Root  Tests 
 
Before turning to our estimates of equations (12) and (13), we investigate whether our 
measures of pt are difference-stationary and whether our measures of ∆pt and it are 
covariance stationary as our theory indicates. To that end, Table 1 reports the Dickey-
Fuller test statistics for the series under consideration. The sample periods employed in 
calculating the statistics are the longest feasible ones. 
 
The Dickey-Fuller statistics reject that our measures of ∆ pt and it are difference stationary 
and except for Germany fail to reject that pt is difference stationary. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of difference-stationarity for pt does not mean that pt is difference-
stationary, however. We therefore examined our five series for pt using the KPSS test, 
which makes covariance-stationarity the null hypothesis. Table 2 reports the test statistics 
that we obtained. We reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for all five series. On the 
whole, then, the evidence indicates that pt is difference-stationary and it is covariance-
stationary for each of the countries. 
 
3.3  Results from Estimation 
 
We used OLS to fit equations (12) and (13) to data for Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, which were 
described in section 3.1. The resulting estimates are reported in Table 3. The Fama-Fisher 
effect is always estimated to be negative and often statistically significantly so
15. By 
contrast, the Gibson effect is always estimated to be positive and highly significantly so. 
 
These two findings are broadly consistent with our theory. Furthermore, the Gibson 
effect, which the theory implies should equal the interest semielasticity of money 
demand, is estimated to range between 2 and 4.5 years, a plausible value for this 
 
                                                 
15 Barsky and Bradford de Long (1991, p. 827) also found a negative Fama-Fisher effect for the United 
States and the United Kingdom during this period. They call this finding “the principal strike against the 
Fisher effect.”   16
Table 1 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
 
Series  Statistics 
Logarithm of the Belgian Wholesale Price Index  -2.19 (0) 
Logarithm of the French Wholesale Price Index  -2.82 (1) 
Logarithm of the German Wholesale Price Index  -3.60
b (1) 
Logarithm of the UK Wholesale Price Index  -1.84 (0) 
Logarithm of the US Wholesale Price Index  -0.96 (0) 
Differenced Logarithm of the Belgian Wholesale Price Index  -7.24
a (0) 
Differenced Logarithm of the French Wholesale Price Index  -5.16
a (0) 
Differenced Logarithm of the German Wholesale Price Index  -5.56
a (1) 
Differenced Logarithm of the UK Wholesale Price Index  -8.28
a (0) 
Differenced Logarithm of the US Wholesale Price Index  -5.44
a (0) 
Belgian Free-Market Rate of Discount  -3.44
b (0) 
French Open-Market Rate of Discount  -3.23
b (0) 
German Open-Market Rate of Discount  -3.14
b (0) 
Market Rate of Discount in Amsterdam  -4.10
a (0) 
Average Swiss Discount Rate at Various Banks of Issue  -3.81
a (0) 
UK Open-Market Rate of Discount  -5.32
a (0) 
US Commercial Paper Rate  -5.97
a (0) 
Notes. The integers in parentheses are the degrees of augmentation, which were chosen to minimize the 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The regressions for the interest rates and inflation rates include 
intercepts while those for the wholesale price indices include both intercepts and linear time trends, thereby 




KPSS Test Statistics 
 
Series  Statistics 
Logarithm of the Belgian Wholesale Price Index    2.21
a (0) 
Logarithm of the French Wholesale Price Index    1.61
a (0) 
Logarithm of the German Wholesale Price Index    0.72
a (1) 
Logarithm of the UK Wholesale Price Index    7.52
a (0) 
Logarithm of the US Wholesale Price Index    4.30
a (0) 
Notes. The prewhitening filter for the test was based on spectral OLS with a lag length determined by the 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The lag length is indicated by the integer in parentheses. The 
superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 3 
Annual Estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson Effects 
for Seven Countries over Various Pre-WWI Periods 
 
 
Country and Sample Period  Estimate of βF  Estimate of βG 








































Notes. The estimated regressions take the form  1 tFF t F t pi αβ ε − ∆= + +  and 
tG G t G t pi αβ ε ∆ =+ ∆ + , and the figures in parentheses are standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c 





It is instructive to also estimate the contemporaneous Fisherian relationships 
  01 tt t pi φ φω ∆= + +  (19) 
and 
 
  01 , tt t ip ϕ ϕϖ =+ ∆ +  (20) 
where the φ s and ϕ s are parameters and ω t and ϖ t are error terms. According to our 
theory, the OLS estimators of φ 1 and ϕ 1 should converge in probability to λ (1–ρ ) and 
                                                 
16 For example, R. W. Hafer and Dennis Jansen (1991) estimated the long-run elasticity of demand for M2 
with respect to the commercial paper rate in the United States over the period 1915-1988 to be 0.12, which 
implies an interest semielasticity of 3 years at a nominal interest rate of .04 per annum.   18
[] [ ] { }
2 11 2 / 2 (1 ) 1 (1 ) var( ) / var , tt t vu λρ λ λ ρ µ η
−− − +− + − −  respectively.
17 Therefore, 
when we estimate equation (19), we should obtain the negative of what we did when we 
fitted equation (12), and when we estimate equation (20), we should obtain a positive 
value that is strictly less than half the reciprocal of what we obtained when we fitted 
equation (13). 
 
Table 4 reports the estimates obtained by fitting equations (19) and (20) to our data and 
repeats the estimates reported in Table 3 for easy comparison. Our estimates of φ 1 are 
indeed approximately the negatives of our estimates of the Fama-Fisher effect,
18 and our 
estimates of ϕ 1 are indeed positive and strictly less than half the reciprocals of our 
estimates of the Gibson effect. 
 
Traditional tests of Fisherian interest theory were based on OLS estimates of equation 
(20) or more elaborate version with lags of the inflation rate. Our theory provides an 
explanation for why such an approach is doomed to estimate values much less than one if 
prices are flexible and money is supplied inelastically.
19 The probability limit of such 
estimators is strictly less than half the reciprocal of the interest semielasticity of money 
demand. If the semielasticity is 3 years as suggested in footnote 15 and the variance of 
aggregate-supply shocks, money-supply shocks and money-demand shocks is large 
relative to the variance of aggregate demand shocks, this probability limit may well lie 
between 0.025 and 0.064 years
-1, the range of estimates reported in Table 4. 
 
The data that we have used to estimate the Fama-Fisher effect are inappropriate to some 
extent. Ideally, pt and pt-1 in the regression 
      1 tFF t F t pi αβ ε − ∆= + +  
should be the logarithms of the price level at the discrete times t and t-1 and it-1 should be 
the yield at the discrete time t-1 on a bond maturing at the discrete time t. By contrast, our 
data are annual averages, and the terms for the interest rates are appreciably less than one  
                                                 
17 See the appendix for derivations. 
18 In Table 4 the average of the estimates of φ 1 is 1.36, while the average of the estimates of β F is -1.41. 
19 Footnote 9 explains why “testing Fisherian interest theory” is impossible in any case.   19
Table 4 
Comparison of Estimates from Contemporaneous Fisherian 








β F Estimate 
 
ϕ 1 Estimate  
 
























































































Notes. For the estimates of β F and β G, see the notes in Table 3. The estimates of φ 1 and ϕ 1 are obtained by 
applying OLS to regressions of the form ∆ pt = φ 0 + φ 1it + ω t and it = ϕ 0 + ϕ 1∆ pt + ϖ t, and the figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
year. For most of the countries, it is not possible to improve on the data that we have 
employed. For the United Kingdom and the United States, however, we can more closely 
approximate the theoretically appropriate series since we have monthly data. Specifically, 
let t now be a continuous index, and let it be the continuously compounded riskless 
nominal interest rate at time t with a term of n years to maturity. Then to a close 
approximation, the Fama-Fisher effect can be estimated by applying OLS to a regression 
of the form
20 
1 , nt F t n F t np i β ε
−
− ∆= +              (12′ ) 
where ∆ npt ≡  pt–pt-n 
 
                                                 
20 Note that multiplying by the factor n
-1 is necessary to annualize ∆ npt.   20
Since UK open-market paper had a term of three months during the sample period, we 
estimate equation (12′ ) with n = ¼ and use data for March, June, September and 
December for a sample period from June 1824 to December 1913,
21 obtaining the 
estimated regression 
1/4 1/4 ˆ 4 0.048 1.551
(0.017) (0.486)
tt p i − ∆ = −  
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The negative Fama-Fisher effect 
has strengthened and become more significant with improved data. 
 
During the sample periods that we consider, US commercial paper had terms to maturity 
ranging from four to six months. On the assumption that each of these terms is equally 
represented in the data, equation (12′ ) implies that 
  1/2 , tFF t F t pi αβ ε − ∇= + +  (21) 
where  []
1
1/6 1/2 1/12 1/2 1/2 3 3( ) (12/5)( ) 2( ) tt t t t t t pp p p p p p −− − − − ∇ = −+ −+ −  and 
[] 1/3 5/12 1/2
1
3
Ft Ft Ft Ft εεε ε −− − ≡ ++ Our assumptions imply that   Ft ε  is orthogonal to it-1/2 
and serially uncorrelated if the observations are spaced at least six months apart. 
 
We used OLS to fit equation (21) to semiannual observations in June and December over 
the sample period extending from June 1879 to December 1913, obtaining 
  1/12 ˆ 0.152 2.965 ,
(0.047) (0.953)
tt pi − ∇ = −  
 
                                                 
21 The monthly open-market discount rate for the United Kingdom is included in the NBER Macro History 
Database, which is available on NBER’s website. However, NBER’s collection on the monthly wholesale 
price index starts only in January 1885. From January 1824 to December 1850, we use an index from 
Arthur Gayer, Walt Rostow, and Anna Schwartz (1953, v. 1, pp. 468-470). Finally, from January 1851 to 
December 1885 we use an index from Jan Tore Klovland (1993), who interpolated the annual index of A. 
Sauerbeck (1886) into a monthly index. No adjustment is needed between the series of Klovland (1993) 
and NBER. A five-year overlap between the series of Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz and Klovland (1993) is 
used to adjust the level of the former series. It is possible to triple the sample size by employing every 
monthly observation on ∆ 1/4pt and it-1/4, but doing so would require accounting for the induced monthly 
noninvertible second-order moving-average structure of the error term. Spacing the observations so that the 
terms of the open-market paper do not overlap avoids this problem, albeit with some loss of efficiency.   21
where again the numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
22 Once again, better data 
make the estimated Fama-Fisher effect even more negative, and it remains statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
4  Empirical Analysis for the Interwar and Postwar Periods 
 
Our model provides new insights for periods after World War I. Central banks took many 
years to learn how to be effective. The learning process may not immediately have given 
rise to “elastic currencies;” i.e., large values of γ . Furthermore, prices may have remained 
fairly flexible for an appreciable time. As a result, the Fama-Fisher effect may have 
remained negative for many years, and a positive Gibson effect may also have been 
present. Even when monetary policy began to take the form of interest-rate control and 
became focused on domestic objectives and prices became distinctly sticky, the Gibson 
effect may still have remained positive because theory does not rule out this possibility. 
For these reasons, we estimate Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects using data for the 
interwar and postwar periods. 
 
4.1 The  Interwar  Period 
 
Table 5 reports interwar estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects for France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The French and UK data are quarterly for 
March, June, September and December,
23 while the US data are semiannual observations 
for June and December.
24 The parameter β F is estimated from regressions of the form 
(12′ ) and (21). 
 
                                                 
22 The data come from Macaulay (1938) and Warren and Pearson (1935). 
23 Both the French and UK interest rates are open-market discount rates. The French price level is measured 
by the Paris Retail Price Index for 34 articles, while the UK price level continues to be measured by the 
wholesale price index for all commodities. All series come from the NBER Macro History Database. 
24 Our interest rate for the United States is the commercial paper rate, which we obtained from Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941. We measured the US price level with the consumer price index, which we 
obtained in a private communication from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is also available from the 
NBER Macro History Database. When available we prefer to use the consumer price index in preference to 
the wholesale price index since it better approximates the concept of the price level in our theory.   22
Table 5 
 
Estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson Effects 
for France, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
in the Interwar Period 
 
 
Sample Period  Estimate of βF  Estimate of βG 







































 Notes. The data for France and the United Kingdom are quarterly, and the estimated regressions take the 
form 4∆ 1/4pt = α F + β Fit-1/4 + ε Ft   and ∆ 1/4pt = α G + β F∆ 1/4it + ε Gt. The data for the United States are 
semiannual, and the estimated regressions take the form 
1/2 tFF t F t pi αβ ε − ∇= + +  and ∆ 1/2pt = α G + β F∆ 1/2it + 
ε Gt. The figures in parentheses are standard errors, and the superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
For the United Kingdom and the United States, the Fama-Fisher effect is estimated to be 
negative and the Gibson effect is estimated to be positive in all sample periods, and both 
effects are often statistically significant. France is very different: its Fama-Fisher effect is 
estimated to be significantly positive and its Gibson effect is estimated to be negative, 
albeit not significantly so. 
 
Table 6 reports interwar estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects for three other 
European countries for which only annual data are available. It is based on annual 
average data from Tables 65, 67 and 71 of Homer and Sylla (1991), and Table I1 of 
Mitchell (1992). The Fama-Fisher effect is estimated to be positive and statistically 
insignificant for Belgium but negative and statistically significant for the Netherlands and    23
Table 6 
 
Annual Estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson Effects for 
Selected European Countries in the Interwar Period 
 
 
Country and Sample Period  Estimate of βF  Estimate of βG 














Notes. The estimated regressions take the form ∆ pt = α F + β Fit-1 + ε Ft   and ∆ pt = α G + β G∆ it + ε Gt, and the 
figures in parentheses are standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Switzerland. The Gibson effect is estimated to be positive for all of the countries but is 
not statistically significant for any. 
 
On the whole, Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the Gibson’s Paradox was alive and well in the 
interwar period and indeed similar to the one observed before World War I. That it 
continued to hold indicates that it is not merely a gold- or commodity-standard 
phenomenon. Rather, it arises under the more general conditions described in our model. 
Moreover, a negative Fama-Fisher effect is always accompanied by a positive Gibson 
effect, a feature clearly captured by case I of our model. 
 
Keynes and many other observers believed that the Gibson Paradox no longer held after 
World War I. They can be excused for this belief, which in most cases was based on 
eyeball econometrics applied to levels of the series. Because of major discoveries in time-
series econometrics in recent years, we now know that the relationship between a 
differenced-stationary and a covariance-stationary series cannot be so readily assessed. 
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Table 7 
 
Quarterly Estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson Effects 
for the United States in the Postwar Period 
 
 
Sample Period  Estimate of βF  Estimate of βG 























 Notes. The estimated regressions take the form 4∆ 1/4pt = α F + β Fit-1/4 + ε Ft   and ∆ 1/4pt = α G + β G∆ 1/4it + ε Gt, 
and the figures in parentheses are standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The sample period begins in 1953Q2 in order to 
avoid the Pre-Accord Period. 
 
 
4.2  The Postwar Period 
 
Table 7 reports postwar estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects for the United 
States. It is based on quarterly observations in March, June, September and December on 
the three-month Treasury bill rate and the consumer price index.
25 The Fama-Fisher 
effect is estimated to be positive and statistically significant, while the Gibson effect is 
typically estimated to be small and statistically insignificant. In keeping with the findings 
of Romer and Romer (2002) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), the Fama-Fisher effect 
is estimated to be less than one over the sample periods 1953Q2-1960Q4 and 1980Q1-
2004Q2 and to be greater than one in the sample period 1961Q1-1979Q4.
26,27  
                                                 
25 We downloaded the data on the three-month Treasury bill rate from the website of the US Federal 
Reserve Board and the data on the consumer price index from the website of the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The latter series was seasonally adjusted. These data and all others used in this study are 
available from either of the authors upon request. 
26 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) estimated that τ  appreciably exceeded one during the 
Volcker/Greenspan monetary regime (1980Q1-present) and was somewhat less than one during the 
previous monetary regime (1960Q1-1979Q4). Romer and Romer (2002) estimated that it exceeded one in 
the monetary regime in place during the 1950s. 
27 Fama fitted a similar equation over a sample period from January 1953 to July 1971, obtaining an 
estimate of β F that did not differ significantly from one. He interpreted this finding as providing evidence   25
Table 8 
 
Quarterly Estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson Effects 
for Selected Developed Countries in the Postwar Period 
 
 
Country and Sample Period  Estimate of βF  Estimate of βG 
















































 Notes. Except for Germany and the Netherlands, the estimated regressions take the form 4∆ 1/4pt = α F +    
β Fit-1/4 + ε Ft   and ∆ 1/4pt = α G + β G∆ it + ε Gt. To obtain a consistent estimate of the Fama-Fisher effect for 
those countries where we are constrained to use the call money rate, we employ the slightly different 
regression equation 
1/4 4, tFF t F t pc αβ ε ∆= ++  where 
t c  is the average call money rate over quarter t. This 
regression equation must be estimated using instrumental variables dated no later than two quarters before 
date t; we use 
1/2 t c −  for this purpose. (See the appendix for the details.) The figures in parentheses are 
standard errors. The superscripts a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 reports postwar estimates of the Fama-Fisher and Gibson effects for nine other 
countries. For Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, it is 
based on quarterly observations in March, June, September, and December of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
for his joint hypothesis of rational expectations and a constant expected real interest rate. When we estimate 
over the sample period 1953Q2-1971Q2, we obtain an estimate that also differs insignificantly from one. 
We interpret this finding very differently, however. Fama’s sample period spans a period in which τ  
exceeded one (1953Q2-1959Q4) and another period when it fell short of one (1960Q1-1971Q2). By 
happenstance, Fama’s estimate just turned out to be too close to one to reject the null hypothesis of β F = 1.   26
country’s three-month Treasury bill rate and its consumer price index.
28 We must use a 
three-month interest rate on private bills for Japan, while for Germany and the 




The Fama-Fisher effect is estimated to be highly significantly positive for every country 
and also less than one as our theory indicates. The Gibson effect is estimated to be 
positive for all but one country though appreciably smaller than we found for the periods 
before World War II. Although the Gibson effect is still mostly estimated to be positive, 
Gibson’s Paradox is not a pervasive feature of postwar economies, while a strong positive 
Fama-Fisher effect is. The most likely reason for this juxtaposition of effects is that 
monetary policy now provides an infinitely “elastic currency” in the form of Taylor-type 
interest-rate policies. The postwar period probably also has appreciably stickier prices 




This paper specifies a set of conditions under which the Fama-Fisher effect is negative 
and the Gibson effect is positive, a conjunction that is doubly paradoxical. Unlike Barsky 
and Summers (1988), our model is not anchored to the classical gold standard. Instead, 
we find that the presence of Gibson’s Paradox depends crucially on price flexibility and 
the elasticity of the currency. In particular, when prices are flexible and money is 
inelastically supplied, a negative Fama-Fisher effect and a positive Gibson effect are 
simply two sides of the same coin. 
 
Of course, the classical gold-standard period does indeed satisfy both conditions and as a 
result Gibson’s Paradox does characterize that period. Surprisingly, however, Gibson’s 
                                                 
28 All of the data come from the CD-Rom for October 2004 of the International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
29 German and Dutch call money rates come from monthly hardcopy issues of the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. Using call money rates creates some econometric problems. 
The appendix develops adjustments that can approximately handle these problems.   27
Paradox also largely characterized the interwar period, a period in which the classical 
gold standard no longer prevailed. Our theory has a ready explanation for this 
phenomenon: currencies had not yet become elastic and prices continued to be fairly 
flexible. By contrast, Gibson’s Paradox is not a pervasive feature of the postwar period. 
A strong positive Fama-Fisher effect is evident and the Gibson effect is only weakly 
positive—if positive at all. In our theory, this combination of effects can arise if the 
central bank pursues a Taylor-type interest-rate rule and no doubt more generally when 
money is elastically supplied. After World War II, central banks in many developed 
countries became more active in accommodating liquidity demand and more focused on 
domestic objectives than they had been during earlier periods.
30 In the meantime, many 
of them also adopted aggressive inflation-targeting rules. All of these institutional 
changes have had a profound impact on the dynamics of the actual and expected inflation 
rate. With sticky prices, inflation can be readily forecasted, enabling an inflation-
targeting central bank to induce a positive Fama-Fisher effect. At the same time, the price 
level and interest rate no longer bears any necessary relationship with each other, thus 




6.1  Introducing Persistency into et 
 
In this section we modify the assumption that et is an i.i.d. white noise. Instead, we 
assume that it follows the first-order autoregression process  1 ttt ee θξ − =+ , where ||1 θ <  
and  t ξ is an i.i.d. white noise with finite variance. 
 
In this case, the minimum-state-variable solution to equation (15) is 
 
() ( ) ()( )









ρβ ρ ρ ϕ τ κ β ρ ϕ
θβ θ θ ϕ τ κ β θ ϕ
−
−
 = −−+ −− 
 −− − + −− 
 (16′ ) 
                                                 
30 A commonly known critique of central banks during the Great Depression is their failure to supply 
enough liquid assets; e.g., Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963) and Charles Kindleberger 
(1973).   28
Substituting (16′ ) into (14), using (3) and  1 , ttt ee θξ − =+  and rearranging, we obtain 
  tt t p Au Be ∆ = −  (17′ ) 
where 
() ( ) ()
1 11 11 1 A ρβ ρ ϕ κ ρ τ
− −−  ≡− − + −    
() ( ) ()
1 11 11 1 . B θβ θ ϕ κ θ τ
− −−  ≡− − + −    
Substituting (17′ ) into (7), we have 
 (1 ) . tt t iA u Be τρ τθ =+ −  (18′ ) 
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  −− −   =   − + −   
 
since 
2 var var /(1 ). tt e ξ θ =−  
 
If 1–Bθτ  > 0, the value in braces is strictly less than 1, and can even be negative if 
var var tt u ε  . If 1–Bθτ  < 0, the value in braces is strictly greater than 1. Finally, if      
1–Bθτ   = 0, the value in braces equals 1. 
 
It is easy to verify that when  0 θ = , var var tt e ξ =  and the probability limit is the same as 
that derived in Case II. When θ  approaches 1, B approaches (τ -1)
-1 and the probability 
limit approaches 1. 
  
Consider the benchmark case of 1–Bθτ   = 0. Substituting 1/θτ  into the definition of B and 
rearranging, we obtain the following quadratic equation for θ :   29
  ()
2 f( ) 1 1 0 θβ θ β ϕ κ θ ≡− ++ + = 
The function f(θ ) is a parabola that opens upward and has an intercept on the ordinate of 
1. Since f(1) = –ϕκ  < 0, it also has two positive roots, one on each side of 1. Denote the 
smaller root as  1 θ . Since f′ (1) = 2β  – (1+β +ϕκ ) < 0, the minimum of f(θ ) is to the right of 
1 θ = . This function is shown in Figure A. Note that when θ  lies on  1 (0, ) θ , there is no 
lower bound for the probability limit and it might even be negative. On the other hand, 
when θ  lies on  1 (, 1 ) θ , there is no upper bound for the probability limit. These results are 
summarized in Table A. When θ  is close to θ 1, however, the probability limit is τ
-1. For 
this reason, we regard β F as informative about the parameter τ  and hence about how 
monetary policy was conducted; hence, our analysis for the postwar period. 
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It is easy to verify that when  0 θ = , this is the same as that derived in Case II. The more 
general result is summarized in Table A below.  
 
Table A. Dependence of Probability Limits on θ  
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6.2  Probability Limits for the Contemporaneous Regressions 
 
In case I, the OLS estimator of φ 1 converges in probability to 
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which is strictly positive and smaller than ½λ
-1. Moreover, it is smaller, the larger 
var( )/ var tt t vu µ η −  is. 
 
In case II, the OLS estimator of φ 1 converges in probability to 
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ρβ ρ κ ρ ϕ τ ϕ τ ρ
− −
− −
 −− + −− ∆   =
 −− + − +  
   31
which is strictly less than 
11 τρ
−−
 and can even be negative if var var tt eu  . 
 
Finally, the OLS estimator of ϕ 1 converges in probability to 
()
()
() ( ) ()
() ( ) ()
2 12
2 12 2 2
11 1 v a r v a r cov ,





ρβ ρ κ ρ ϕ τ ϕ τ ρ κ ϕ
ρβ ρ κ ρ ϕ τ ϕ κ ϕ
− −
− −
 −− + −− ∆   =
∆  −− + − +  
 
which is strictly less than τρ and can even be negative if var var tt eu  . 
 
6.3  Adjustment for Using the Call Money Rate 
 
Let t be continuous and ct be the call money rate at time t. For simplicity, call money is 





























0 4. tt s cc d s − ≡ ∫  It follows that 





of the various premia
Ft Ft F t t t F cEc εεβ β −

≡− − + 

  (24) 
 
According to the expectation theory of the term structure, the last term of equation (24) 
should be zero. More generally, it may have a variance that is small relative to the 
variance of the other two terms, or it may be approximately uncorrelated with 
information available on or before time t–½. In either case,  Ft ε   is approximately 
uncorrelated with information available on or before time t–½. Then to a close 
approximation, equation (23) can be estimated consistently by using the quarterly average 
of the call money rate lagged two quarters as an instrumental variable. 
 
   32
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